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SLOVENIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY ON 
NATO ENLARGEMENT' 
Karl W. Ryavec 
INTRODUCTION 
Why did the United States government not support Slovenia's 
inclusion in the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO and what 
can Slovenia and its supporters do to further Slovenia's inclusion if 
another round of expansion occurs? Although the reasons for Slovenia's 
exclusion are not yet fully clear, the information available suggests that 
the main reasons had more to do with the Administration's tactics in 
domestic politics and the views of Slovenia held by some of its highest 
members than with objective considerations or matters of principle. 
Political decisions, even important ones, are often made more on the 
basis of attitudes, incorrect information and the results of political and 
bureaucratic struggles than by reference to either facts or academic 
theories of alliance behavior. This does not mean that defensible 
reasons for Slovenia's exclusion from NATO have not been made in the 
NATO expansion debate of the past few years. 
The Origins of NATO Enlargement 
The end of the Cold War forced a reassessment of NATO's view 
of the requirements for European security. Although the changes within 
the Soviet Union and East Central Europe brought about by 
Gorbachev's policies removed the major problem NATO had faced, 
they raised new and unsettling ones. Accordingly, NATO studied the 
European security environment for sixteen months and in November 
1991 adopted a new strategic concept. It states that Europe was living 
with new uncertainties and potentially faced new instabilities arising 
from the "difficulties ... faced by many countries in Central and Eastern 
I I am indebted for many useful comments by Andrzej Korbonski, 
Minton F. Goldman, Roger E. Kanet, John S. Micgiel, MJ. Peterson, 
and Richard Staar. My informants interviewed "on background" are 
not individually identified. 
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Europe." At the same time NATO created a new institution in response 
to the changed circumstances concerning it, the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) , for consultation and cooperation with 
the former members ofthe Warsaw Pace However, the NACC was not 
capable of meeting the security demands of the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. It lacked a decision-making structure and offered no 
security guarantee. By 1993 a RAND study argued that only full 
membership in NATO could resolve the East Europeans' security 
concerns. Soon the idea of enlarging NATO was being debated within 
the U.S. government. Supporters argued that the U.S. somehow had to 
show that it was still committed to maintaining European security, that 
NATO continued to have relevance after the Cold War, and that reform 
in Eastern Europe could be facilitated and would be rewarded. The 
Secretary General of NATO was publicly advocating significant 
changes in security architecture and warning, "In the world of today 
you simply cannot live in security surrounded by chaos." The then 
ongoing massive violence in the former Yugoslavia was probably having 
a strong effect on thinking on security matters. One result was the 
creation by NATO in January 1994 of the Partnership for Peace 
(PFP) a compromise offering no security guarantees but going beyond 
the NACC by offering the ex-communist states opportunities for 
interaction with NATO militaries and for contributions to NATO 
endeavors such as the force in Bosnia.3 
2 
3 
NATO's strategic concept agreed upon in Rome on 7-8 November 
1991. NATO Office of Information and Press. On the NACC, see the 
Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 1991. NATO 
Office of Information and Press. 
The published version of the RAND study appeared as Ronald D. 
Asmus, Richard L. Kuglar, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New 
NATO," Foreign Affairs 4 (September/October 1993): 28-40. On the 
debate in the U.S. Government, see Daniel Williams, "Clinton's 
National Security Adviser Outlines U.S. Strategy of Enlargement," 
Washington Post, 22 September 1993: A16. The quotation from 
Manfred Worner, the NATO Secretary General, in his "NATO's Role 
in a Changing Europe," conference paper, 35th Annual Conference of 
the !ISS, Brussels, 9 September 1993. On the creation of PFP, see Les 
Aspin, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Partnership for Peace: 
Remarks Prepared for Delivery ... to the Atlantic Council of the United 
States," Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C., 3 December 1993. 
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The enlargement of NATO was formally approved at the 
January 1994 NATO summit meeting in Brussels. In December 1994 a 
White House statement emphasized that expansion was intended to be 
part of a new and larger European security structure involving both the 
European Union (EU) and the Council (now Organization) for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). That same month 
President Clinton, speaking in Budapest, stated that the new 
democracies of East Central Europe must not be consigned to a "gray 
zone." President Yeltsin immediately countered by warning that 
enlargement risked bringing a "Cold Peace" to Europe. Nevertheless, 
by March of 1995 Vice President Gore was saying that NATO 
expansion "must take place at the same time the relationship between 
NATO and Russia is deepened and clarified." The Administration had 
decided that it would pursue both NATO enlargement and improvement 
in relations with Russia, policies that many commentators say are 
mutually exclusive. In August of 1995 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott put forth a defense of NATO expansion emphasizing its function 
of strengthening democracy and reform in general in prospective 
members. In September the NATO enlargement study set forth the 
benefits of expansion at length and also, with a view toward Russian 
objections, pointed out that there was "no a priori requirement for the 
stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members."4 
Realism on U.S.-Slovenia Relations 
Any discussion of the relationship of the Slovene and United 
States governments, if it is to be potentially productive of improvement, 
must be realistic. The simple fact of the matter is that personnel in the 
U.S. government and members of Congress are not highly cognizant of 
even the existence of Slovenia and, if they are, they may see it as 
"communist," "neo-communist" or as some sort of anti-democratic 
structure or one that is lacking in positive attributes in some way. As a 
result, suspicion or even negative attitudes may be present on the U.S. 
side. 
4 Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review if 
Books 42, 13 (10 August 1995): 27-30. "Study on NATO 
Enlargement," NATO Office of Information and Press, September 
1996, 2, 9-10. 
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This does not mean that people-to-people contacts and ties are 
bad or even average. American visitors to Slovenia can come away with 
pleasant memories of their stays. The problem for Slovenia is that few 
such people have any political "clout" in the U.S. But this may change a 
bit for the better as more American political leaders visit Slovenia. 
Recent visitors have included Senators Lugar and Biden and other 
leading American congressional figures. 
In addition to the problems of lack of American knowledge and 
understanding there is the problem for Slovenia caused by the main 
concerns of the superpower status and requirements of the United 
States. In fall 1997 the main foreign policy concern of the U.S. 
government was undoubtedly the Middle East and particularly the 
question of how to get Israel and the Palestinian Authority "back on 
track" toward a better relationship. By early 1998 the U.S. was 
preparing to attack Iraq if it did not allow the UN inspectors leeway. By 
May Washington was wrapped up in issues of U.S.-China relations and 
the detonations by India and then Pakistan of nuclear weapons. Other 
major American foreign policy concerns are: the "new strategic 
environment" and the uncertainties it creates; Russia with its weak 
government but its nuclear-tipped missiles on "hair trigger" alert and 
potentially "leaking" missile materials and nuclear know-how; China 
as a new and unpredictable nuclear-armed strategic competitor in the 
Far East beginning to add substantially to the U.S. trade deficit; the new 
phenomenon of the NIS (newly independent states) of the former 
Soviet Union with vast reserves of oil and natural gas in some of them; a 
starving but militaristic and nuke-developing North Korea; inter-
national drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism from 
abroad. And let us not forget Bosnia and Kosovo and the hellish 
problems there that do not go away. Failure there, not unlikely, may 
discredit the Clinton Administration's entire foreign policy. As one 
columnist puts it, "In the post-Cold War world the combustible cocktail 
of weapons proliferation, religious extremism, rogue states, and free 
markets is becoming the biggest threat to U.S. interests."s 
In this unstable context how can tiny Slovenia even be noticed, 
particularly since official Washington also has to accustom itself to the 
S 
, 
Thomas L. Friedman, "Missile Myopia," The New York Times (here-
after NY]) 2 October 1997: A2S. 
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existence and particularities of a number of other new states, e.g., 
Uzbekistan, Georgia, Latvia? Some of these may be much better situated 
than Slovenia in U.S. politics, e.g. , Armenia, or possess natural 
resources very important for the U.S., e.g., Kazakhstan. 6 As one 
Slovene government official said to me, "Slovenia is not important for 
America." Indeed, as one American pundit puts it, "How many 
Americans know the difference between Slovenia and Slovakia?"7 
A story from my days in the U.S. Navy illustrates the problem. 
Once our little ship, a destroyer escort, encountered an American 
aircraft carrier. We immediately rendered honors, since its captain was 
certainly senior to ours. But, to our dismay, the carrier did not return 
honors. It ignored us and simply sailed on, majestically oblivious to our 
petty, workaday existence. True, Slovenia could demand American 
attention, but such an approach would, first, be "un-Slovene" and two, 
counterproductive. 
The Slovene-U.S. relationship is fundamentally affected by the 
fact that the United States is still dominated politically by Protestants 
stemming from northern Europe. As a result, there is an American 
6 
7 
While I was working in the U.S. Government during 1995-96 I was 
told by an employee of AID (Agency for International Development) 
that Armenia was number one in per capita U.S. foreign aid. The new 
"oil patch" of the Caucasus and neighboring Central Asia is receiving a 
great deal of attention in Washington. For example, when the president 
of Azerbaidzhan , ex-apparatchik G aidar Aliev, came to the U.S. capital 
in August 1997 his newly independent country was "at the top of the 
international agenda" and profiting from what Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott has called " the geopolitics of oil." See David 
Fouquet and Alison Beard , "Aliyev Exploits Petroleum to Boost Baku's 
Stock," The Washington Times 31 July 1997: A 11. See also the editorial 
by Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, "Evolution of an Oil Rush," 
NYT6 August 1997: A25. They call the Caspian Sea "the hottest spot in 
the oil industry." 
William Safire , "The End of Yalta, " NYT 9 July 1997: A29. Safire 
seems to have the gist of it, however. He says, "Slovakia is backward and 
grumpy, ... Slovenia is cheerti.1ily enlightened ... " Still, it does not help 
that in an English-language dictionary the words "Slovene" and 
"Slovenia" can come between "sloven " and "slow. " Would Alpinia be 
better? 
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tendency to see East Europeans and others not from northern Europe as 
distant and different "others."8 The United States has tended to make its 
policies toward Eastern Europe less grand than its statements on the 
area. The scholar Charles Gati has realistically described U.S. policy 
toward Eastern Europe by writing, "Since 1949 ... the United States 
sought diversity rather than democracy, liberalization rather than 
liberation. "9 
Also, there was very little intellectual preparation for the fall of 
communism. Some say Sovietology "failed." In any case, academics 
tended to see communism in power as a long-term if not permanent fact 
oflife. For example, a leading scholar of East Central Europe, Andrew 
Gyorgy of the George Washington University, once wrote, "It would be 
futile to talk about a 'loosening' of the Socialist alliance or demand even 
a peaceful 'ideological engagement' in that area. Equally, the Cold War 
terms of 'liberation' or 'rollback' have lost their relevance .... "lo 
Certainly the Bush Administration was opposed to the breakup 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. See Bush's "chicken Kiev" speech 
telling the Ukrainians to stay in the USSR. A former Secretary of State, 
Lawrence Eagleburger, has spoken of the predictability and relative 
ease' of dealing with big entities. American governments can be 
predisposed to big powers over small ones. This is despite the fact that 
many Americans outside government tend to favor "underdogs" over big 
powers and that some of the states of East Central Europe have been 
called "American charter states" since they were founded in 
connection with American politics and attitudes, e.g., President 
Wilson's Fourteen Points. But that was "then." The American national 
character has probably changed some in the course of this century to 
8 
9 
10 
I have made this point somewhat differently in my United States-
Soviet Relations (New York: Longman, 1989) 246. 
Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham: Duke UP, 1986) 
220. 
Andrew Gyorgy, Some Signposts in United States-Eastern European 
Relations: 1963-1973, Reprint Series 49 (Washington, D.c.: George 
Washington UP, 1973) 12. Gyorgy added that the U.S. would have to 
operate in the area on the "operational principles of flexibility and 
accommodation," (14). Such a position seemed realistic at the time, 
but American academe never caught up with reality as it evolved in East 
Central Europe. 
NATO ENLARGEMENT 57 
. , 
more stress on "me" and less on others. And there is an American 
tendency to look down on small states, perhaps because they are seen as 
weak. 
On 21 June 1991, the then Secretary of State, James Baker, 
visited Belgrade and warned the leaders of Croatia and 
Slovenia that the United States would not recognize their 
states' independence .... But, as a CIA report issued earlier in 
the year had concluded, the breakup of Yugoslavia was already 
taking place. 1I 
Baker's statement may well have encouraged the Yugoslav elite to 
attack Slovenia and Croatia. It also suggests that despite the 
transparency of political change abroad a U.S. administration can stick 
with outdated policy. There are many reasons for this. One is that any 
U.S. government is dealing with so many issues at once that it is unable 
to identify any particular development quickly. Also, the perpetual 
inter-agency conflict may cause new developments to be blocked. And, 
since the U.S. has world-wide interests, a new departure anywhere 
risks hurting the U.S. position elsewhere. Lastly, subordinates are loath 
to bring superiors "bad news," and, even if they do, it may well not be 
accepted. As the Washington saying goes, "One is always punished for 
doing the right thing. "12 Only truly expert politico-bureaucratic 
capability could allow one to "beat the odds" and win in this context. 
Slovenia's situation in American politics is suggested by the 
incorrect claim, in a 1996 letter of a Member of Congress to a 
constituent, that Slovenia was then "placed in a separate category" 
(from other East Central European states) because it was selling arms to 
II 
12 
David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 15. Four days later, Slovenia and 
Croatia declared themselves independent. 
This is said on the basis of the author's experience as a William C. 
Foster Fellow in the State Department building, with the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, during the academic year 1995-96. 
I am reminded that the CIA person charged with identifying coming 
crises advised the Bush Administration that Saddam Hussein was 
probably going to invade Kuwait but that the warning had no effect 
within the Administration. 
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"unfriendly countries in the Middle East.,,13 Although this claim was in 
error, it had to have a negative effect on Slovenia's standing "inside the 
beltway." Slovenia's image is not helped by its characterization by 
Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia. He has 
written: 
Their virtue was democracy and their vice was selfishness. In 
their drive to separate from Yugoslavia they simply ignored the 
twenty-two million Yugoslavs who were not Slovenes. They 
bear considerable responsibility for the bloodbath that followed 
their secession. 14 
This . is pretty strong stuff and goes way too far as well as being 
false and unrealistic. How could Slovenia have averted the bloodbath in 
Bosnia? Zimmerman's assertion may signify, however, that Slovene 
aspirations were seen as a nuisance by some American diplomats, 
particularly those who had served in Belgrade. It may well be that U.S. 
Government officials' views critical of Slovenia, which we shall see 
again below, were common within the government. It was such views, 
specifically that Slovenia ought to have tried harder to get along with 
the Yugoslav elite, that Prime Minister Drnov~ek tried to counteract in 
his speech at Boston University some years ago. The American faith in 
compromise can be unrealistically applied abroad. 
Another problem for Slovenia in the U.S. is that many 
personnel of the U.S. government see Slovenia, if they see it at all, as 
just another East European, ex-communist and ex-Yugoslav country 
with all the characteristics Americans see as negative features in such 
systems. And certainly the "post-communist" countries have not 
undergone a clear break with their communist pasts. Most of them are 
governed by persons whose careers were made in communist parties . 
In any case, in many American eyes Slovenia is from the 
communist "side of the tracks." And, with the American entertainment 
media presenting a warmed over "red menace" supposedly stemming 
from Russia as one of the current "threats," Slovenia's image in the 
13 
14 
A letter of 1996 to a constituent from Nancy Pelosi, Member of 
Congress for the 8th District of California. 
Warren Zimmerman, Origins oj a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 
1996) 71. 
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u.s. is unavoidably affected negatively. Since, as the thinking seems to 
go, Russia was communist, any other country that was communist is 
tarred with the same brush. The Cold War lives on in some Americans' 
thinking. IS 
The U.S. Government, particularly because of the Clinton 
administration's mercantilist stress on increasing exports, is quite 
sensitive to any attempt by an ally or potential ally to purchase weapons 
or other military equipment in countries other than the United States. 
Quite a flap was produced in Washington in the late spring of 1995 when 
it appeared that the Slovene Defense Minister had decided to buy 
Israeli, and not American, military radios. Real consternation quickly 
ensued in Washington. A rather high-level delegation was dispatched 
almost immediately to Ljubljana to lobby against Slovene plans and 
messages of very high classification on the topic were circulating 
within the U.S. Government. 16 
None of this means the Slovene-U.S. relationship is bad. I 
have heard Defense department officials say they have been impressed 
by some of the Slovene military personnel with whom they have dealt. 
State Department officials have said favorable things about the people at 
the Slovene Embassy good professionals, "very experienced and 
competent," helpful, etc., and that Slovenes have been important to the 
IS 
16 
See Bernard Weintraub, "For Hollywood Villains, It's Cold War II," 
NYT, 6 August 1997: B1; on the U.S. dualistic policy toward Russia, see 
Fred Hiatt, "Don't Cold Shoulder Russia," The Washington Post 
(hereafter WE') 4 August 1997. Hiatt's piece parallels my own observa-
tions from my experience in the U.S. Government. The Administration 
is both aiding and opposing Russia and possibly other ex-communist 
states. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, has argued that 
such is not U.S. policy. See his article of early I September 1997 in The 
Financial Times, "The Great Game is Over." 
I left the government in late May 1996 and accordingly do not know the 
outcome of this typical flap. A similar problem occurred in Poland's 
relations with NATO and the U.S. in 1997. When it was learned that 
Poland was about to buy missiles from Israel, the American and British 
ambassadors protested to top Polish government officials and the deal 
was shelved, at least for a time. Although the U.S. position in such 
matters is supported by reference to the ideal of NATO interoperability, 
economic considerations are also involved. See NYT 20 September 
1997: A6. 
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U.S. government as "interpreters" and "explainers" of the present 
rump Yugoslavia and its leaders, including Milo~evic. One U.S. 
diplomat said in 1993 that Slovenia and the U.S. had no big issues 
dividing them. However, an American complaint heard was that the 
Slovenes tend to come up with seemingly great ideas that cannot be 
implemented while the Slovenes say that the Slovene desk officer at 
State is changed too often. They would like to have one person to deal 
with for a definite period. One U.S. Defense Department official said 
that the top Slovenes they deal with are impressive but not the lower-
ranking people. "Access" means a great deal in Washington. Slovene 
diplomats in Washington did not get to talk with either Tony Lake, 
President Clinton's first national security adviser, early in the 
Administration. They did, however, get to talk with Vice-President 
Gore's foreign affairs advisor, Leon Fuerth. 17 
Slovenia has a growing trade relationship with the United 
States and appears to import more from the U.S. than it exports to it. In 
1996, according to Slovene government statistics, Slovenia imported 
goods worth about 324 million dollars from the U.S. and sold it goods 
worth about 290 million dollars. For 1996 this amounted to only about 
three percent of Slovenia's exports and 4 percent of its imports. 
Slovenia's main trading partners are the members of the EU. The U.S. 
share of Slovenia's foreign direct investment is only about one percent. 
A nice little addition to this figure was Goodyear's investment of $120 
million in a Slovene tire company in 1997.18 American tourists to 
Slovenia are not numerous, perhaps about 12,000 per year in recent 
years, nothing like the large numbers from Austria, Italy or Germany, 
but at about the same level as tourists from Britain and Switzerland. 19 
17 
18 
19 
This is based partly on my interviews at the U.S. Department of State in 
May 1993 and discussions with a U.S. Defense Department official 
during 1997. 
NYTll December 1997: D2. 
Courtesy Embassy of Slovenia, Washington, D.C. U.S. statistics 
undercount U.S. exports to Slovenia since some of them go via third 
countries, particularly Austria. See also: Home Page Slovenia: 
http://www.uvi.si/slo. The US-Slovenia Business Council may also be 
useful for information. The e-mail address of its Executive Director, 
Thorsten Knutsson, is: info@usbizcouncil.org. 
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A U.S. Department of Commerce publication of 1996 called 
Slovenia "one of Europe's neglected opportunities" for U.S. business 
and "one of the region's safest commercial environments" and stated 
that Slovenia's economic strength exceeds that of the region's "high 
proftle" countries but suggested that Slovenia's economic prospects will 
not be generally recognized until it achieves membership in the EU.lI 
One Slovene official, in discussing the U.S.-Slovene economic 
relationship, with the U.S. in seventh place in trade (after Russia), 
emphasizes the long distance and the smallness of the Slovene market 
as precluding a significant relationship in trade. And Slovenia lacks 
enough high-quality products desirable to the U.S. to make a real impact 
in the U.S. market. 
Still, the U.S. and Slovenia have not had any bad mutual 
experiences and Slovenia does not see the U.S. as having any aims in 
Europe dangerous for Slovenia. In addition, American official policy 
has been important for Slovenia and is welcomed in several respects. 
Slovenia enjoyed clear U.S. support during the minor troubles with Italy 
in recent years. The cooperation on military matters has been 
"extremely fruitful." Every six months a U.S. warship is in a Slovene 
port, thereby indirectly affirming Slovenia's right to direct access to the 
sea, important since Croatia and Slovenia have not yet come to an 
agreement on their maritime boundary. In economics Slovenia was 
granted MFN and even more GSP, whereby American tariffs for 
Slovene goods are lowered further. (GSP, or Generalized System of 
Preference, is now enjoyed by all the countries of Central Europe.)21 
The U.S. is strictly following the principle that five successor states 
derive from the former Yugoslavia and therefore not allowing Serbia to 
claim all Yugoslav government assets. If the U.S. maintains, along with 
NATO, a position of strength in Southeast Europe after SFOR (and its 
successor force) withdraws it will probably need Slovene assistance. In 
this regard, a top U.S. Government official said in September 1997 that 
21 
Paul Marin, "Slovenia: Alpine Nation Forges Ahead," U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Central and Eastern Europe: Commercial Update 
(November 1996) 1-6 and 7. 
GSP is a tariff preference (zero tariff) offered some states by the 
European Union. (It was adopted by the EC in 1971.) Apparently, the 
U.S. has decided to grant it to many countries, including Slovenia. 
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a "follow-on force" would be based in Hungary "and maybe in 
Slovenia." How Slovenia would respond to this cannot be stated now. 22 
Slovenia and the Prospect of NATO Membership 
Prior to any consideration of NATO membership for Slovenia, 
or for any other putative member in East Central Europe, it must be 
recognized that membership in the European Union (EU) would be a 
good and perhaps preferable substitute. What the area needs to develop 
its capabilities and to "return to Europe" is an authoritative and useful 
form of political and economic Western European acceptance. 
However, because of Western Europe's current serious economic 
difficulties, this is out of the question for now. With twelve to fourteen-
percent unemployment almost everywhere in Western Europe and with 
powerful domestic agricultural interests, as well as a renascent 
chauvinist nationalism in some countries, bringing low-priced 
competitors into the fold is politically impossible. Accordingly, even 
though Slovenia was invited in December 1997 to begin talks on EU 
accession and despite its now being one of a small group of countries on 
the fast track for membership, it cannot become a member for some 
time. Still, Slovenia's chief negotiator with the EU said in 1998 that he 
expects Slovenia to be admitted by 2003 and to qualifY for monetary 
union in 2005.23 NATO membership alone would not and cannot solve 
the fundamental problems of East Central Europe. It is financially and 
politically costly and not favored by those who desire an all-European 
security structure that would include Russia. Although several countries 
of East Central Europe, including Slovenia, have association 
agreements with the EU, actual membership still awaits internal 
restructuring of their economies and an improvement of the economies 
of Western Europe and the "biting of the bullet" offonnal acceptance. It 
is feared in Western Europe that "enlargement could irrevocably 
change the character of the EU" and turn it into a "kind of development 
community." Indeed, according to the eminent scholar Ralf 
Dahrendorf, as quoted by the Hungarian writer Peter Nadas, the EU 
"isn't telling the truth to the East Europeans ... Gennany and France 
22 
23 
Interview, September 1997. 
RFEjRL Newsline (Prague), e-mail service, 15 May 1998. (Hereafter 
RFEjRL). 
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will block their entry." Accordingly, "We have no other possibility but 
to enlarge NATO to the east.":!! 
Though NATO may be a "lesser option" it is still sought 
because the present is unstable and the future is uncertain. The Nobel-
Prize-winning poet Czeslaw Milosz says that "only geopolitics can 
provide for these peoples and cultures." In the more "realist" words of 
Ignac Golub, State Secretary of the Slovene Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "While the Cold War has ended, neither the nature of man nor 
that of international relations has fundamentally changed.,,25 Freud may 
.~ 
have been correct, at least for Europe, in the thesis of his Civilization 
and its Discontents, that civilization breeds its own breakdown. 
Certainly, three times in this century the United States has sent a 
military force to Europe to help reinstate stability. A central pertinent 
fact is that, as the war in Chechnya has starkly shown, even though 
Russia currently cannot fight its way out of the proverbial paper bag, its 
elites have not given up 500 years of Russian hegemonistic thinking. As 
recently as October 1997 a Russian diplomatic note stated that "Russia 
views the Balkans and southeastern Europe ... as a vital sphere of its 
interests." Given Russia's history and potential future capabilities, this 
cannot be dismissed as mere words. Also in the same month, the 
Russian defense minister said that President Yeltsin wants NATO 
transformed into a purely political alliance. lh This would kill NATO as 
24 
25 
Lecture by Franz-Lothar Altmann, 27 September 1995, as reproduced 
in Woodrow Wilson Center, East European Studies, Meeting Report, 
November-December 1995: 3-4. See also Jacqui Moorhouse, "Central 
and Eastern Europe: Accession to the European Union," Aussenpolitik 
(English ed.), IVj1996: 368-78. For Dahrendorfs view, see Peter 
Nadas, "Democracy Without Borders," NYT 28 September 1997: 15. 
In late October 1997 the EU was close to deciding to open talks in 1998 
with six prospective members, including Slovenia. See NYT 27 October 
1997: A 10. 
From a book review by Donald Davie of Milosz' A Year of the Hunter in 
The New York Times Book Review 28 August 1994: 9. Milosz was once a 
diplomat of communist Poland and after defecting wrote a profound 
book on the nature of communism, The Captive Mind. Ignac Golub, 
"Preparing for Membership: Slovenia's Expanding Ties to NATO," 
NATO Review, 44.6 (November 1996): 24-25. 
Both in RFEjRL 2 October 1997. Russian commentary on NATO 
enlargement has tended to include the claim that Russia had been led to 
64 KARLW. RYAVEC 
. , 
NATO. If even a weak Russia speaks, people listen and act 
accordingly. Russia has always emerged strong and expansionist from 
its disasters. A Lithuanian leader has pointed out the obvious the key to 
peace in Europe is the security of small states "because there are no 
threats to the security of large countries."II And Golub has correctly 
pointed out that "it is clearly in the interest of European security that 
the U.S. maintains its presence in Europe.,,28 
What Slovenia Offers NATO 
There are several good reasons why Slovenia could be a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and why its 
membership would be in NATO's and America's interest. In fact, there 
are so many supporting reasons it is easy to leave some off the list. Partly 
because of this it did seem for a time that Slovenia would be included in 
the first group of those invited. Slovenia is at a par or even better in most 
NATO requirements, except possibly in the transparency of the defense 
budget, a deficiency easily remedied. First perhaps, Slovenia is clearly a 
democracy, as are almost all the members of NATO, and the one with 
the highest standard of living among the many states that have emerged 
from communism. (Not all present members were democracies when 
they became members, e.g., Turkey, which is not fully a democracy 
even now.) Second, Slovenia's geographical location would be of 
particular importance as NATO moves into East Central Europe. 
Slovenia provides, for example, a "land bridge to Hungary" from both 
Italy and the Adriatic. Slovenia was never part of the Warsaw Pact, as 
were Poland and Hungary, and accordingly does not present the sorts of 
security problems with classified matters NATO may have with some 
new members. In addition, most Slovenes want to be part of NATO and 
are quite willing to bear NATO's costs and obligations. For example, in 
II 
28 
believe that such a development would not occur. For example, a 
Russian writer claims that a top-level Helsinki meeting on 10 July 1992 
decided that NATO would be only "a component of European 
security" and accordingly not enlarged. See Yuriy N. Rakhmaninov, 
"Some Thoughts on NATO Enlargement," SShA (USA) 2 (February 
1997); trans. In DJRL, 15 April 1997: 1-2. I have also been told that 
James Baker, when he was Secretary of State, told the Russians that 
NATO enlargement would not occur beyond Germany. 
Vytautas Landsbergis, speaking in Prague, RFEjRL 21 April 1997. 
Golub 25. 
• 
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a Slovene poll taken in 1997 forty-three percent of those polled 
preferred NATO membership over neutrality and sixty-three percent 
said they would vote for NATO membership.19 Militarily, too, Slovenia 
has shown impressive combat capabilities, albeit as a territorial defense 
force. In the Ten Day War of 1991 its forces prevented the Yugoslav 
army in Slovenia from going into action by quickly surrounding its 
barracks and defeating the units of the Yugoslav expeditionary force 
sent to the Slovene border crossings. Within two days the Slovenes had 
more than a thousand prisoners and had stopped most Yugoslav air force 
flights over Slovenia.3O Lastly, and for some Americans unfortunately 
the most important, authoritative Russian government officials have 
stated unequivocally more than once that Russia does not at all care if 
Slovenia joins NATO.)1 Indeed, if NATO enlargement had a southerly 
emphasis, as some NATO members desire, Russians would be relieved. 
Accordingly, those Americans who have in effect granted Russia a 
"veto" over NATO expansion need not be concerned over Slovenia's 
entry into NATO. Despite the fact that Secretary of State Albright has 
made a good argument why Russia ought not to have a veto, it does 
seem to have one,l2at least over former parts of the USSRjoining. 
Several Slovene officials have stated the Slovene intention to 
join NATO. For example, Prime Minister Drnovsek, upon signing the 
NATO Partnership for Peace offer in 1994, stated: "We have made a 
firm decision to continue in this vein, and we are sure that the final 
stage ... will be membership of NATO for Slovenia." And Davorin 
19 
30 
)1 
l2 
A telephone poll taken by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the 
University of Ljubljana, reported in Mladina 2 September 1997: 16-17. 
This result is similar to that in Czechoslovakia, where sixty percent of 
the population says that NATO membership is the best solution to the 
country's security problems. RFEjRL 20 May 1998. 
Personal observations in Slovenia during the Ten Days War. 
At a round table discussion on Russian views on NATO expansion held 
at the Davis Center of Harvard University on February 11, 1998 a 
Russian diplomat, in response to a question about possible Russian 
reaction to the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia, stated quite 
emphatically that the question was not worthy of a -serious response 
since it was hypothetical at this time. That is, for Russia the NATO 
problem does not rest on these states' entry. 
Testimony of Secretary of State Albright before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 7 October 1997. C-Span, II October 1997. 
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Kracun, the then Slovene minister for foreign affairs, spoke in 1996 of 
Slovenia's "vital interest for joining the alliance" in order to be "fully 
integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community" and added, "Slovene 
foreign, security and defense policy ... is aimed at early accession to 
NATO." At the same time he also stated that Slovenia was participating 
in Partnership for Peace (PFP) "without hesitation" and cooperating 
with IFOR and extending this cooperation to SFOR in allowing transit 
and overflight of NATO forces and also offering some of its medical and 
military facilities to the NATO effort in Bosnia.33 Indeed, in a way, 
Slovenia is already in NATO, but without formal membership. For 
example, Slovenia participates actively in PFP, the NATO preparatory 
organization. In 1995 Slovenia soldiers took part in a large PFP military 
exercise in Louisiana and since then Slovene military forces have held 
maneuvers with several NATO countries' forces within the PFP 
structure. Recently, Slovenia, Italy and Hungary have set up a joint 
brigade.>! 
The American press has published some very positive 
references to Slovenia as a prospective new member of NATO. Popular 
sentiment for joining NATO was said to be "overwhelming" in Slovenia 
and it appeared that "the mere prospect of membership has prompted 
Slovenia to accelerate its reform program .... " It was also noted that all 
Slovene political parties backed NATO membership.lS 
Slovenia came to be seen as a future member of NATO as part 
of a natural politico- strategic process. A source who has worked for 
NATO notes in mid-1997: 
33 
>! 
lS 
Golub's speech is in Brussels Le Soir 31 March 1994: 2; translated in 
FBIS-EEU-94-063, 1 April 1994: 54; Kra~un's Address to the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Brussels, 11 December 1996; 
in NATO Integrated Data SelVice (NIDS), 11 December 1996 . 
• 
NATO member defense ministers regularly visit Slovenia. See, for 
example, Veter (Maribor), 1 January 1998 on the visit of the German 
defense minister, and Dnevnik (Ljubljana) 8 January 1998 on the visit of 
the Danish defense minister. On the joint brigade, see RFE/RL 20 
April 1998. 
NYTll June 1997: AI; NYT18 May 1997: E. 1; and RFE/RL 18 April 
1997. 
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The European members of NATO were extremely reluctant to 
go along with NATO enlargement. The Brits and French 
opposed it initially as did most of the Mediterranean countries. 
Only when they realized that it was a test of U.S. engagement 
in Europe did they come on board. [But KR) none of them 
want to pay a penny for it. That said, they did make a 
convincing case that if enlargement was going to happen, it 
should have strategic foundations which meant inviting 
Romania and Slovenia.36 
French president Chirac "strongly backed" the candidacy of 
five states, including Slovenia, stressing the assistance for the 
consolidation of democracy and making for Romania an argument that 
would apply to Slovenia as well. It was not a member of the Warsaw 
Pact. TI (France may have been motivated partly by a desire to look better 
than the U.S. and gain "points" in new places.) Several prominent 
American political figures also supported Slovenia's inclusion in 
NATO. For example, Senators Biden and Lugar have publicly supported 
it. And Senator D'Amato (R-C-NY) specifically listed Slovenia among 
the nations which he said "should be given invitations to negotiate for 
inclusion in NATO." In addition the staff of the U.S. Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe found Slovenia and eight other 
states to be "in substantial compliance" with international standards 
relating to human rights, democracy and the rule oflaw. 38 
Objections to NATO expansion were widespread in the U.S. 
during 1997 and still are today, despite the favorable Senate vote of 80-
19 of 30 April 1998. Isolationism, fixation on cost and an inclination to 
technical objections have not disappeared from American political 
culture. But no case of specifically arguing against Slovenia's inclusion 
has been found in print by this author. The Prime Minister of Canada, 
Jean Chretien, ridiculed American politicians' support for NATO 
enlargement as being solely for "short-term reasons, to win elections." 
36 
38 
Personal communication, 1997. 
Embassy of France, Washington, D.C., News from France, 30 June 
1997: 2. 
CSCE Digest, 20.6 (June 1997): 63-64 and 67-68. The eight states 
found to be in compliance are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. Slovakia, 
and Macedonia were found not in compliance. 
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True, the U.S. government had opted for expanding NATO only after 
the April 1993 Washington ceremony to open the Holocaust Museum at 
which Presidents Havel of the Czech Republic and Walesa of Poland 
urged President Clinton to admit East European countries to NATO. 
One magazine article even said Clinton, then in office for only three 
months, had been "cornered" by Havel and Walesa, and that Clinton 
accepted the prospect because the polls indicated that foreign policy 
successes improved his chances for re-election. This decision by the 
Administration did not automatically bring support within the 
government. One rumor has it that Ambassador Holbrooke shouted at 
top Defense Depaltment officials who opposed enlargement that they 
were disloyal since the President had already decided in favor of it. 
Henry Kissinger criticized the project. He noted, for example, that "the 
new members of NATO are clearly joining in a second-class status 
subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of 
other NATO forces and nuclear weapons." This conveniently "forgets" 
that there have always been "second-class" non-nuclear members of 
NATO, Denmark, for example, and that what he calls "second-class 
status" attests to the defensive posture of NATO. Perhaps the most 
scathing condemnation of NATO enlargement comes from the 
respected veteran essayist of American foreign policy, William Pfaff. 
For him, NATO expansion is 
spiritually empty because fundamentally unserious, unrealistic 
and vainglorious, designed to glorify its authors and reward the 
administration's clients. There is no need for it among either 
allies or fonner enemies. Its promotion at the zenith of 
American power will generate the enmities that the abuse of 
power invites.39 
It may be no accident that PfatT is often resident in Paris, that 
capital of opposition to all things American. In any case, opposition to 
39 Kissinger is cited from his column of8 June 1997 in WP. Chretien was 
talking in Madrid at the summit meeting at which three new potential 
members were named. He did not know a live microphone was nearby. 
See NYTll July 1997: A6; Douglas Waller, "How Clinton Decided on 
NATO Expansion," Time 14 July 1997; Henry Kissinger's column, WP 
8 June 1997; William Pfaff, "Clinton's Global Project: Pompous and 
Unneeded," International Herald Tribune 29 May 1997, quoted in 
David Johnson's Russia List (e-mail), 29 May 1997. 
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the enlargement of the Alliance was many-sided citing unnecessary 
cost, antagonizing the Russians and even undermining the fragile 
democracy there, weakening NATO, "fixing something that ain't 
broke," putting American lives on the line for Prague, etc. (The old 
disparaging argument of Prime Minister Chamberlain at the time of 
Munich about people "in a faraway country ... of whom we know 
nothing" was not actually quoted but the sense of it was conveyed often 
and in many ways.) 
And then there was the "Russianist" argument of opposition to 
enlargement. For example, in "An Open Letter to President Clinton" of 
June 1997, organized by Susan Eisenhower and signed by more than 
forty prominent national security figures, it was confidently claimed, as 
if its signers could foretell the future, that NATO expansion would 
strengthen the non-democratic opposition in Russia, undercut those 
who favor cooperation with the West, force the Russians to question the 
entire post-Cold War settlement and galvanize resistance in the Duma 
to START II and III.«l 
The Administration's position and strategy vis-<\-vis Russia had 
already been stated by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (who 
had translated Khrushchev's memoirs as a Time correspondent and 
once had been the President's roommate at Oxford). In October 1996 
Talbott had said that the U.S. Government is pursuing the process of 
NATO enlargement "in parallel with" constructing "a cooperative and 
mutually reassuring relationship between NATO and the Russian 
Federation." He added, revealing the Administration's actual priorities, 
"There's no subject to which I've devoted more of my energies. "41 
41 
"An Open Letter to President Clinton," late June 1997. Susan 
Eisenhower is Chairman, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 
Chevy Chase, MD. The letter suggested that PFP be enhanced and a 
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship be developed. The Administra-
tion has been working along these lines. 
Strobe Talbott, speech at the 50th anniversary celebration of the 
Harriman Institute of Columbia University, 29 October 1996; DJRL 
30 October 1996. Talbott added, "We should weave relationships and 
devise incentives that will encourage Russia to evolve as a democratic, 
secure, stable, prosperous state, at peace with its neighbors and 
integrated into a community of like-minded nations." Another aspect 
• 
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Some of the arguments against NATO expansion claimed that 
excessive influence was being granted to Russia even before new states 
joined. For example, the emigre analyst Dimitri K. Simes condemned 
the NATO-Russian agreement of 1997. 
So, ... before any new members have been invited to join the 
alliance, Russia has already gained unprecedented input into 
NATO discussions through the newly created NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council ... From now on Russia will become a 
heavy presence in NATO deliberations.42 
Expanding NATO while at the same time propitiating Russia 
will be a most delicate and difficult business. For, whatever the realities 
at any given moment, the appearance may well be one of Russian gain 
and NATO loss. 
Despite the fluidity and uncertainties of the run-up to the 
enlargement of NATO, it did not seem in late 1996 and the first half of 
1997 that Slovenia's candidacy to be included in the first round of 
NATO expansion was precluded or out of the question. Foreign 
Minister Thaler said at the end of May that it looked as if "the shares of 
• 
Slovenia are rising" and that Slovenia expected to be invited to Madrid 
as a country that had fulfilled all the criteria for NATO membership.43 
The outcome would all depend on which variables came out ahead. This 
was impossible to predict until just prior to the Madrid meeting of 
NATO. 
42 
43 
of U.S. policy as it in fact operates, to have influence in certain areas of 
the former Soviet Union, is never stated. 
Dimitri K. Simes, "Russia to Get Too Big a NATO Voice," Newsday 
22 May 1997; quoted in DJRL 22 May 1997. Kissinger too decried the 
formation of a formal NATO-Russia relationship. "The ultimate irony 
is that Russia, through the Founding Act, will have a voice in NATO 
two years before the first wave of new NATO members do." Kissinger, 8 
June 1997. 
A Reuters dispatch in the International Herald Tribune 31 May-l June 
1997: 6. 
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Exclusion at Madrid: The Reasons Why 
• 
The Madrid summit of NATO met on 8-9 July 1997, but about 
three weeks earlier the U.S. had let it be known that it preferred that 
only Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary be invited to join NATO 
in the first round of possible admissions. This announcement, by 
Secretary of Defense Cohen at a NATO ministerial meeting in 
Brussels, "clearly took some members by surprise," according to a 
NATO source. It may well have alienated U.S. allies. A NATO 
diplomat spoke of the "brutal" way the U.S. had made its position 
known.41 Apparently, even NATO Secretary General Solana was not 
told of the U.S. decision. One NATO source says that there was 
"bewilderment across the board" even in Washington and that the 
decision was made "somewhere between Kornblum and Albright" and 
that the Slovenes had been "fooled."4s Ironically, there had been 
rumors circulating "inside the beltway" in late May that the 
Administration had not yet made up its mind on which countries to 
invite, even that the decision could be made right up to Madrid. Given 
the number of interests within the U.S. Government and the difficulties 
of coordinating them, this is not unbelievable. At this time, early June, 
some in Slovenia were still hopeful that Slovenia would be in the first 
tranche, though one official of the Foreign Ministry said he thought 
Slovenia would not be included. Apparently, Secretary Albright had told 
Prime Minister Drnovsek in May that Slovenia met all the 
requirements for membership but had added that more could be done, in 
opening markets and in further privatization, for example. In mid-June 
Drnovsek said that Slovenia's exclusion might produce 
"compensations," in the form ofincreased support for its membership in 
the EU. On the twenty-first Dr. Ernest Petrie, the Slovene ambassador 
in Washington, said "We had pretty big hopes. "46 
The American statement of intentions did not reduce the 
support for Slovenia's inclusion by several European governments. At 
the Denver "summit of the eight" (now that Russia was included in the 
Group of Seven for the first time) there were "clear tensions" with the 
41 
4S 
46 
Reuters, Brussels, June 12,1997. NYT21 June 1997: 6. 
Personal communication, 1997. 
An American visiting Slovenia in early June. Drnovsek's statement 
about "compensations" was reported by Reuters, Poitiers, 13 June 
1997. Petri(\ was quoted in NYT21 June 1997: 6. 
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French and the Italians, who wanted to include Slovenia and Romania 
in the first new group to enter NATO.47 Indeed, at this time nine 
members of NATO, including Canada, favored Slovenia's early 
inclusion, and several leaders of NATO states "made clear" they were 
not ready to let Washington decide the matter prior to the Madrid 
NATO summit on 8 and 9 July. Poland and Hungary, too, expressed 
their support for Slovenia's inclusion.48 The Slovene government also 
did not accept the American decision without response. The Slovene 
foreign minister said that his country would continue to push for early 
membership and on the twenty-second Drnov~ek sent Clinton a letter 
asking him to reconsider his position on Slovenia.4} 
After the NATO meeting in Madrid on 8 July the U.S. position 
on NATO enlargement became the NATO position. Only Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech republic would be invited to join in 1999. 
Apparently, there was debate on this, with France, backed by eight 
countries, arguing the case for a greater enlargement that would include 
Slovenia and Romania. The U.S., supported by Britain ("NATO is a 
military alliance, not a political club," said Prime Minister Blair), the 
Netherlands, Norway, Iceland and Denmark, held out, and the only 
consensus that could be arrived at was for three new members. The U.S. 
had won. After all, as the Italian Prime Minister Prodi realistically said, 
"Without America, NATO doesn't exist." At the end of the day, with the 
prodding of French president Chirac, a statement was issued, backed by 
all sixteen members, that put Slovenia and Romania first among the 
nine also rans: "With regard to the aspiring members, we recognize 
with great interest and take account of the positive development toward 
democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeast European 
countries, especially Romania and Slovenia."so The Secretary of State 
47 
48 
49 
so 
NYT21 June 1997: 6. A French official called the American decision 
"fundamentally imperial" and asked, "When exactly did the Americans 
go from leadership to hegemony?" while an Italian spoke of "American 
presumption." 
Reuters, Poitiers, 13 June 1997. The Polish Premier stated that both 
Poland and Hungary wanted Slovenia included in the first wave of 
NATO expansion, but he noted that "it is not up to us .... " RFEjRL 3 
July 1997. 
RFEjRL 13 and 23 June 1997. 
NYT 9 July 1997: Al and A8. Commentary here on the 8 July NATO 
meeting is from this issue. Slovenia's backers within NATO were said to 
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made an implicit promise to all those not accepted with the pledge that 
"no European democracy will be excluded because of its position on the 
map." 
The U.S. may have missed an historic opportunity to expand 
NATO. It would have been easier to do it then than it will be later when 
Russia will only feel either stronger or more alienated from the West. 
Also, by going for a larger expansion the Administration could have 
argued it was doing something momentous for the stabilization of 
Europe and not just doing what was safest. Imagine the Marshall Plan 
not being directed to all of Europe. 
Clearly, what the U.S. wanted carried the day. What were the 
Administration's reasons for excluding Slovenia? Although this 
question cannot be answered with clarity by this writer at this time, 
exploration of the question may provide some sense of what Slovenia 
might do in trying for admission to NATO in the future. 
In the first place, there is the tactical side of American 
domestic politics. Being restrictive suggests that one is being careful 
and using objective criteria. The initial U.S. decision in 1993 to enlarge 
NATO had raised a small storm of opposition in the country. The 
Administration wanted to disarm that opposition, and increase chances 
for Senate ratification ofa revised NATO treaty, by keeping the list of 
prospective members as short as possible. "Small is beautiful," said one 
top administration official to me in October 1997.51 Also, most politically 
important people in the U.S. have heard and know something about the 
three countries approved by the Administration. Slovenia is much less 
known, and when it is, it is seen as "Yugoslav" in some way. Not to be 
forgotten is "post-Cold War euphoria" and also the American tendency 
to isolationism and "America firstism." NATO enlargement requires a 
"re-commitment" of the United States to new areas, places that were 
conceded to be outside the U.S. "sphere" in 1956, when President 
Eisenhower decided not to aid the Hungarians. Why go back in now, 
many ask? 
51 
be: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Turkey, with Italy 
being the main supporter. NYT8 July 1997: A4. However, other sources 
have said Slovenia had the support of nine NATO members, including 
Canada, which wanted six states invited. 
Interview with a top State Department official, October 1997. 
• 
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A common American rejoinder, particularly within the diplo-
matic corps, to questions on why Slovenia was excluded from the first 
round is: "The Brits were against it." (And so were the Dutch and the 
Danes. The "Anglo-Saxons?") This easy "answer" ignores what might 
have happened if the U.S. had been for Slovenia. It's hard to believe 
any NATO member would have opposed Slovenia then unless the 
French "flipped" to an anti-Slovene position just to oppose the U.S., a 
not uncommon "Gaullist" ploy which always plays well in French 
politics. Of course, the fact that Britain opposed Slovene entry suggests 
Slovenia ought to "work on" this some. 52 
An "easy out" for the U.S. was the military factor. It has several 
aspects. First, Slovenia undoubtedly lacks "the big divisions" that 
Poland and even Romania, I am told, can provide. (Remember, in the 
Warsaw Pact Poland's mission was to take the low countries by airborne 
assault with its eight airborne divisions.) Second, it is probably difficult 
for a typical American military officer to appreciate what is, in effect, a 
guerrilla war army, even one with the high capability demonstrated 
during the Ten Days' War. The U.S. has always limited the promota-
bility of special forces personnel. It still has a Ulysses S. Grant-Patton-
Eisenhower military mentality "chew 'em up" with massed equipment 
and firepower used as recently as the Gulf War. Third, the "keep 
NATO strong" attitude is prevalent in the U.S. Slovenia clearly does 
not bring military "muscle" to the alliance. I have heard Romania 
preferred over Slovenia for this particular reason. Despite the first-rate 
job performed by Slovene military doctors in Albania during the turmoil 
of 1997, the "SeeDer' has said that with only 4,100 full-time soldiers 
and obsolete Soviet-era arms, "Slovenia was not militarily ready to join 
NATO.,,53 There is not much Slovenia can do to overcome this fact. It 
might, however, counter with the "quality" argument that it has a very 
52 
53 
The British Consul General in Los Angeles has been said to have stated 
that the British objection was genuine; that British boys were not going 
to die for Slovenia, but that if Slovenia kept changing it might make it 
into NATO later on. 
NIT 13 June 1997: A6. This sort of point is also made in Michael 
Mihalka, "Why Only Three Countries Will Likely Be Included in First 
Wave of NATO Enlargement," RFEjRL (e-mail) 7 July 1997, as well as 
NYT 29 June 1997: 8-. Slovenia's military does "not yet meet the 
alliance's standards." 
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good small force that would be useful in its area, in keeping a road open 
to Hungary, for example. 
Some high-level U.S. officials have a negative view of 
Slovenia. One actually said to me about Slovenia in October 1997, "I 
don't like their attitude; they don't feel they have any responsibility to 
help solve problems in the former Yugoslavia." He even went on to say 
that Slovenia is responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia. "It started 
it.,,54 This suggests that Slovenia's natural inclination to feel free of 
Yugoslavia is not paying off in the upper reaches of the U.S. 
Administration where, apparently, Slovenia is seen as still "Yugoslav" 
and bearing a responsibility for the solution of problems in what 
Slovenes tend to call the "South." Maybe the best way to deal with this 
problem is to talk about it with Administration officials and show some 
flexibility on the matter. However, this same official suggested that 
Slovenia might be a base for a future follow-on force for Bosnia an 
"over the horizon reaction force." This might serve as a bargaining 
chip for Slovenia's admission to NATO. Another implied criticism of 
Slovenia in the U.S. Government is that it came to the "expansion 
game" late and simply has not done enough to make itself a member. 
Samuel Berger, the President's national security adviser, speaking at a 
White House press conference in July 1997 implied that Slovenia's 
value as a NATO member is seen mainly to "countries bordering 
Slovenia" and that more time is needed to make sure Slovenia (and 
Romania) "maintain the same path" as they have. If they do, their 
admission is a definite possibility, he added. 55 In early 1998 the Secre-
tary of Defense was saying, "The door to NATO is always open," and 
implied he wished that Slovenia had been admitted. 56 
France may have had a role, perhaps inadvertent, in Slovenia's 
exclusion. It seems driven to come up with positions other than those 
held by the U.S. at every opportunity; probably for domestic political 
reasons and the morale of its bureaucracy. By "attaching" Romania to 
Slovenia as a possible entrant France, which most probably favored the 
"Latin" Romania over Slovenia, undercut Slovenia's chances since 
Romania is clearly not ready for NATO membership. It has been on the 
democratic "track" only for several months, not years, as Slovenia has. 
54 
55 
56 
Interview of October 1997. See note 50 above. 
C-Span-2, 2 July 1997. 
Speech in Munich, 8 February 1998, shown on C-Span TV. 
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In the future Slovenia will have to try to avoid becoming "attached" to 
other states that cannot be accepted in the near term, e.g., Slovakia and 
Croatia. 
"Making the second round believable" may well have played a 
role. If Slovenia, which was a "favorite" for first-round admission, had 
indeed been invited in 1997, it would have signaled that the expansion 
was a one-time affair (which it may well be.) Accordingly, leaving 
Slovenia for the promised "second round" makes that far-off eventuality 
seem believable. That is, the Administration did not want to "take the 
heat" of having said, "This time and never again." The admission of the 
"Baltics" and of Slovakia and Croatia is simply not credible at least not 
for a very long time and a very different Russia. "It's saving shoo-ins 
like ... Slovenia for the second round so as to avoid the tough decision of 
which countries to invite then. "57 
Given the great weight the Administration places on 
maintaining the present political path in Russia it was imperative to 
limit the first group invited to the smallest possible number. It may have 
seemed in Washington that three was the most that could be attempted 
without risking (or seeming to risk) Russia going off the rails. It is 
doubtful that NATO expansion alone would cause Russia to do so, but it 
has been under such horrendous pressure from its current and 
continuing national degradation that it is not unthinkable that one more 
shock would cause a political explosion there. Certainly Russia, not the 
West or the U.S., is primarily responsible for its present malaise, but a 
chauvinist voice sounds more loudly and effectively in today's Russian 
politics than any realistic one. In the Administration's eyes, why risk a 
Russian political collapse over Slovenia and Romania? Remember, with 
the French pushing Romania, Slovenia could not be admitted without 
Romania. And, if Romania came in why not the "Baltics?" And if the 
"Baltics," then Russia would have to react and negatively and the 
Administration's foreign policy would have seemed an obvious failure 
that would be pure grist for the American political mill. And putting 
57 Gregory F. Treverton, "NATO Expansion Is a Sensible Move," 
Newsday 16 July 1997; reproduced in DJRL (e-mail) 17 July 1997 and 
Kurt Bassuener, "The NATO Shuffie," (a letter) WP8 July 1997. I have 
received intimations of this reason from other sources. 
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Russian stability first is not only an American fixation. The old 
"Thunderer," The Times (London) stated sensibly, 
Damage limitation is now the name of the game; and the most 
important task by far is to understand that a stable, democratic 
Russia at ease within its shrunken post-imperial frontiers is the 
grand strategic prize without which Europe can never be 
durably secure. 58 
A leading specialist on Russian foreign policy, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 
writes, "NATO expansion could result in a re-polarized Europe ... and 
Russia might turn away from accommodation with the West."S9 With 
voices like these raising the specter of a new Cold War, the 
Administration's caution is understandable. They may be wrong, 
however. A Russia that sees no chance for imperial revival may thereby 
be encouraged to become a normal state. fIJ 
Although no one knows how much NATO enlargement will 
ultimately cost and how much the U.S. will pay, the issue of cost is now 
very much alive in American politics and also between the U.S. and 
its NATO allies. As the GAO says, all cost estimates on this are 
"notional," making it easy to charge the Administration with trying to 
cover up a huge financial outlay. Cost was a big topic in the Senate 
debate on NATO enlargement, and it behooves the Administration to 
come up with some believable (and low) figures, not an easy thing to 
do.61 
58 
fIJ 
61 
Editorial, "Menace in Madrid," The Times (London) 7 July 1997. 
, 
NIT 9 July 1997: AS, quoting an article by Rubinstein in Problems if 
J 
Post-Communism. The columnist Thomas Friedman says, "Russia still 
matters ... and it can thwart our designs ." simply by not joining the 
volunteer fire department." See NYT2 October 1997: A 25. 
This is an argument for NATO expansion made by Polish Foreign 
Minister Geremek in Washington in an interview on Newshour with 
Jim Lehrer, 16 February 1995. 
See U.S. General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement: Cost Estimates 
to Date Are Notional (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, August 1997) and 
two articles in the NYTon the U.S. Senate debate on the costs of NATO 
expansion: 10 October 1997: A 9 and 22 October 1997: All. 
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Conclusion 
It is not yet possible to determine which, if any, of the above 
reasons cited is the main one for Slovenia not being invited to join 
NATO. This might be stated only after additional research and after the 
passage of enough time to enable much more information on pertinent 
U.S. governmental decision-making to become available. Even so, it is 
important not to fixate on anyone or indeed all of the possible reasons 
given above. Chance plays a big role in politics and particularly in 
American politics. Who knows what effect Madeleine Albright now 
being Secretary of State may have on U.S. foreign policy and on 
Slovenia's relations with the United States? She is strongly in favor of 
NATO expansion. Nor can anyone say what it will mean to have Al 
Gore as the next President, certainly a possibility. So much happens in 
the U.S. because of short-lived but crucially important "windows of 
opportunity." Slovenia's very independence is partly the product of 
taking advantage of such a "window" in Yugoslav and European 
politics. Slovenia and its supporters must be prepared to take advantage 
of the opportunities, even momentary ones, that will inevitably emerge 
in the future and may allow Slovenia to enter NATO as it grows from an 
alliance into a "security management institution."62 Such an institution 
is inclusive and defends not only against "threats" but also against risks 
by including many of them within the institution as possible. By this 
reasoning, Russia will eventually be included in NATO. 
If Slovenia keeps being the successful democracy and 
economically reformist country that it is and does not do anything to 
cast itself in a negative light it will enter NATO in the next round, 
assuming there is one. Apparently, the "door" is still open. A leading 
American official said in May 1998 that it was the American view that 
NATO expansion should continue beyond the first round.63 It might be 
worth studying and emulating to a degree the experience of small states 
that have done well in their relationship with the U.S., e.g., Luxem-
bourg, Denmark, Norway, to the extent possible. It might also be worth 
trying to get the "Brits" on Slovenia's side if that is feasible. The U.S.-
62 
63 
The term has been used and defined by Professor Robert O. Keohane of 
Duke University, a leading specialist on international politics. 
Frederick C. Smith, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, speaking in Tallinn, Estonia on 5 
May 1998. RFE/RL 6 May 1998. 
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British "special relationship" does exist and it can count in policy in 
Washington. (l have seen British opposition to a Canadian initiative 
produce instant American opposition to it.) Slovenia's sending of troops 
to participate in SFOR in Bosnia is a very good idea.64 It may mollify 
American government annoyance at Slovenia as well as, more impor-
tantly, show that Slovenia can do what NATO does and thus deserves to 
be a member. Slovenia ought to continue, of course, to participate in 
PFP exercises in the meantime. In addition, Slovenia must appear to be 
as "reformist" in economic matters as possible. This is a topic American 
officials take very seriously. 
There is no valid or overwhelming reason why Slovenia cannot 
enter NATO in the near future. In some ways it is a better potential 
member than the countries invited. But to pursue the goal effectively 
Slovenia and its supporters in the United States must be as realistic, 
imaginative and wide-ranging in their efforts as resources and circum-
stances allow. 
64 
University of Massachusetts 
RFEjRL, "Slovenia Joins Bosnian Force," 4 November 1997. 
Slovenia is now the thirty-seventh participant in SFOR. 
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POVZETEK ' 
SLOVENIJA IN AMERISKA POLITIKA V ZVEZI S SIRITVIJO NATA 
v 
Ceprav razlogi, zakaj ameriska vlada ni bila naklonjena vkljucitvi Slovenije 
ob prvi siritvi Nata, se vedno niso popolnomajasni, se kai.e, da bi morebitni 
negativni pogledi na Slovenijo med elitnimi ameriskimi politiki za zunanje 
zadeve imeli odloeilno vlogo. Pomembno vlogo pri tem je igrala tudi taktika 
Clintonove administracije v domaei politiki (npr. da bi bilo videti, da 
politika v zvezi s siritvijo temelji na bolj racionalni osnovi, kot v resnici je). 
Torej je bila slovenska i.elja po vstopu v Nato irtvovana v prid politicne 
v 
nastrojenosti, potreb in koristi ameriske administracije. Ce bo prislo do 
drugega siljenja Nata, pa ima Slovenija zelo dobre moenosti za sprejem, se 
posebej ee i.e naprej ostane :<gledna demokraticna driava z reformiranim 
v 
gospodarstvom in Ce bo sodelovala v prednatovskih organizacijah, kot je 
Partnerstvo za mir in v Natovi misiji na podroCju nekdanje Jugoslavije. Konec 
koncev je Slovenija bolj pripravljena za vstop kot ostale kandidatke. 
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